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I. INTRODUCTION
I have served the state of West Virginia from the bench for almost thir-
ty-two years, and I expect 2008 to be my last year of full-time judicial service.
The West Virginia Law Review has graciously agreed to publish this article in
which I attempt to describe my judicial philosophy.
The article begins with a summary of my personal and professional life,
the true source of most of my judicial philosophy. Then I review some of the
opinions that I have authored, with quotations that reflect my views. (I have
found that my separate opinions tend to present the most succinct expressions of
my views, unmediated by the constraints that are present when I am writing for
the Court. l) Finally, I attempt to extract a few common themes that have per-
Justice, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
Many of the quotations from opinions used in this article have portions of sentences or
entire paragraphs omitted. In the interest of readability, these omissions are not noted. This ar-
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meated my judicial work. I hope that the reader will find value in this article;
for me, it has been enlightening to take this look back at my life in the law.2
II. PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL HISTORY
I was born on September 25, 1942, down a dirt road in an old farm-
house in west central West Virginia. My twenty-two-year-old mother, Susie
Starcher, lived in the farmhouse with my three-and-a-half-year-old brother and
my fifteen-month old sister. My father, Earline "Dick" Starcher, age twenty-
four, was working in Ohio in a defense plant. He had failed his army physical-
diabetes-a legacy he left to me.
My paternal grandparents lived "up the creek" from our house and
Grandma Starcher checked on my mother daily while my mother was pregnant
with me. But my arrival came unexpectedly one evening when no one was
around to help. Grandma had been there earlier in the day, and she came again
the next day. I once asked my mother, "What did you do until Grandma came?"
Her response was, "What do you think I did; I cleaned you up!" No electricity,
no indoor plumbing, water from a well in the yard, heated on a wood-burning
stove, and a self-delivered newborn. Never tell me that women are the "weaker
sex!"
We were a close-knit family with my father's parents nearby, and my
mother's family only five miles up a dirt road. Our home was just across a
creek from the family cemetery. Next to the cemetery was a small one-room
church building that hosted Sunday School, occasional church services with a
minister, funerals, old-fashioned "shape note singing" sessions, and summer
Sunday picnics in the field where the church stood and cows pastured.
By the time I was one year old, my dad had returned from Ohio and
moved the family "into town," the small Roane County seat of Spencer. We
were a "poor" family, and needed every penny just to get by (Mom eventually
had seven children). When Dad died in 1978 at the age of 59, his salary as a
common laborer had barely passed the $10,000 per year mark.
In our family, there were no such things as shopping trips, vacations, or
recreation for which one would have to pay. For us, "eating out" was going to
the store, buying a loaf of bread and a pack of bologna, and stopping at a road-
side table. As a special treat, after Sunday School "us kids" might be treated to
a nickel popsicle purchased at a filling station-always split in half, of course,
so that one popsicle served two kids. However, large gardens, canning over
ticle uses the mark "***" to separate quotations that are taken from different opinions-not to
indicate omissions within quotations.
2 The initial draft of this article was compiled by my Senior Law Clerk, Thomas W. Rodd,
Esq., aided by West Virginia University College of Law student Stephen E. Altizer. It would be
impossible to acknowledge and give credit to the many colleagues, friends, students, lawyers,
judges, and others who have been a part of the activities that I describe in this article. I thank and
appreciate every one of them.
[Vol. I111
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 111, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss2/6
A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: PEOPLE-ORIENTED JUSTICE
1,000 quarts of food annually, hunting, and milking two cows kept us well fed.
Mom stretched the few food dollars and always set a full table. Mom was so
"tight" that I have often said she would "skin a gnat to save the tallow."
As youngsters, all of the kids in my family had to work. I began deli-
vering papers when I was seven years old, and was working at the A&P grocery
store by the time I was a senior in high school. One of the reasons that I tend to
be pro-union is because when I worked at the A&P thirty-two hours a week as a
member of a union, I earned more than my father at his forty-hours-a-week non-
union job.
During my high school years, the traits of empathy, compassion, and
concern for others began to emerge as a strong part of my personality. As pres-
ident of my 4-H club, I learned the value of sharing knowledge. As editor of
our yearbook and president of my senior class, I learned how to build bridges of
friendship and be a leader. As president of our Baptist Youth Fellowship, I add-
ed a Christian perspective to my worldview.
In the spring of 1960, I became the first member of my family to gradu-
ate from high school.3 In the fall, I headed to Morgantown to become a college
student at West Virginia University. I made good grades, joined the Beta Theta
Pi fraternity, found a part-time job, and was elected president of Helvetia, the
Sophomore Men's Honorary. During the summer of 1961 1 returned home and
worked as a laborer for the State Road Commission. By this time I was begin-
ning to express an interest in politics, and I talked about going to law school.
Many of my fellow State Road workers kindly called me "Governor" or "Law-
yer."
The summer of 1963 was a "high" for me. West Virginia Secretary of
State Joe Burdette helped me get a job as a visitors' guide in our State Capitol.
It was West Virginia's Centennial year, and President John F. Kennedy was to
speak at the State Capitol on June 20, 1963, our State's hundredth birthday. I
was assigned to meet the President's party as it entered the Capitol, take them to
a well-guarded elevator, and then to the speakers' platform area. I remember
President Kennedy, on arrival at the Capitol, immediately asking me for the
location of "the head" -which I showed him.
While working in the State Capitol, I made several African American
friends-a new experience for me, as there were no African Americans in my
home county and few at WVU. With these friends, in August of 1963, I found
myself in Washington, D.C. in a sea of humanity looking toward the Lincoln
Memorial and listening to Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. deliver his famous
speech. My commitment to equality for all persons, regardless of race, became
pressed into my very being, and I have not since wavered from that commit-
ment.
3 My older brother earned his G.E.D. in the military and my older sister graduated from high
school at age 35 with one of her daughters.
2009]
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During the summer of 1963, Secretary of State Burdette also asked if I
would like to work in his 1964 primary re-election effort. I was eager to do so;
therefore, I loaded up on courses-twenty-one hours in the first semester of my
senior year-so that I could drop out of school the second semester and work in
the campaign. Then I could return to summer school and take sufficient hours
to graduate and begin law school immediately thereafter. The campaign was my
first State-wide election. It was an educational experience that had a personal
payoff that I reaped many years later.
I graduated at the end of summer school in 1964, and promptly started
law school at WVU. During my first year I worked as a janitor at the WVU
Hospital on weekends and holidays. The summer following my first year, I
worked on heavy construction at the Fort Martin power plant. I joined Labor-
ers' Local 379; this was my second membership in a union. One day on this job
I worked twenty-three hours straight-a good paycheck that week! I developed
a strong affinity for proud, hard-working union members and a better under-
standing of "organized labor" -jurisdictional disputes and all!
In 1966, while attending law school, I took a job at West Virginia Uni-
versity as a Contract Auditor (business manager) for the Office of International
Programs. After graduating from law school in 1967, I remained at WVU,
where I became an Assistant to the Vice-President for Off-Campus Education.
In my new job I continued to oversee the International Programs work, and I
took on additional responsibilities. I helped develop continuing education pro-
grams for a number of disciplines, and did legal-related chores for the central
WVU staff. I enjoyed university administration, and explored the possibility of
acquiring a doctorate degree, thinking I might like a career in higher education
administration. But my desire to "be a lawyer" kept nagging at me.
In 1969 I ran for Morgantown City Council, losing a close race (but I
was able to win the next year). Also in 1969, after helping a WVU Law School
assistant dean write a grant proposal for a six-county rural legal services pro-
gram, I applied and was hired for the directorship of the program. In April of
1969 I became the first Director of the North Central West Virginia Legal Aid
Society.
I served as Director until early 1976. Our office was aggressive. We li-
tigated consumer issues, welfare rights, black lung claims, and social security
disability cases, to name a few. We sued public officials and fraudulent home
remodelers, and made quite a name for ourselves-good to some, the opposite
to others.
We fought our battles in both federal and state courts, always litigating
for the "little guy" and the disadvantaged. As an advocate for lower-income
people, I traveled through the region "pandering my wares like a huckster in the
market place," -so said a complaint filed against me with the U.S. Civil Ser-
vice Commission. There was some truth to that charge.
In 1972, I ran for Sheriff and lost a close race. During those years I was
active in Morgantown's First Presbyterian Church as a Sunday school teacher
and youth leader, church school superintendent, chairman of the finance com-
[Vol. I111
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mittee, deacon, and ruling elder. Our church youth activities included the nor-
mal camping and car-washes, but we also added the development of social con-
science to our "activities curriculum." My group of kids introduced to our
church the distribution of Christmas food baskets for less advantaged families in
our community-as my youth group had done when I was a high school student
in Spencer. We also helped poor families with relocation efforts when they
were displaced by the construction of Interstate 79 through the Morgantown
area.
In 1975, several of the younger lawyers in Morgantown determined that
our community needed a new circuit court judge, and started planning the elec-
toral replacement of an older incumbent judge with a young upstart-me! I was
thirty-three years old.
We put together a grass-roots campaign that involved over 300 volun-
teers. The "establishment" bar feared me as some kind of "legal aid radical,"
and persuaded a politically well-connected attorney to run against me. But we
captured over 59% of the primary election vote, and in the general election we
won handily.
In November 1976, I was at that time the youngest person in the history
of West Virginia to be elected to the office of circuit judge. As a new judge, I
wanted to open the "mysteries" of our court system to the general public. Of
particular concern to me were the victims of crime who were generally left in
the dark as the system churned out its results. I was determined to see that
(when possible) the victims' interests were factored into the criminal disposition
process.
I also was determined to explore and implement alternatives to costly
incarceration. In most cases, neither the victim nor the community is served by
removing the criminal actor from the community, especially when the crime is a
less serious offense. Restitution for the victim is virtually eliminated when a
criminal actor is incarcerated. So with lesser offenses, my efforts were directed
to seeing that the criminal actor was able to repay the victim and the community
for his/her wrongdoing. To this end, I consistently required defendants con-
victed of lesser crimes to perform real "community service" as part of the sen-
tence.4
4 The assignments that were part of my criminal sentences included work at the Monongalia
County Recycling Center; the local park system; local municipalities; Pricketts Fort State Park;
county offices; Christian Help; planting and maintaining flowers at the entrances of our communi-
ties; painting the city pool; picking up trash; and so on.
Two projects to which I assigned a considerable number of probationers and jail inmates
deserve particular note. They were the construction of the Monongalia County Magistrate and
Family Law Master Court facilities, and the building of an old log barn at Pricketts Fort State
Park.
For the new magistrate and family law master court facilities in Monongalia County, we
created public court facilities that are worth in excess of $700,000.00 at a cost of approximately
$230,000.00. I designed the facility, helped figure out a way to finance it, provided inmate labor,
and worked on it myself. (A local moving company wanted over $3,000.00 to move the offices
5
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As a trial judge, I was an activist. When West Virginia prisons and jails
were found to be overcrowded, the Supreme Court assigned me to resolve the
issue. When tens of thousands of workers' asbestos cases were filed, the Su-
preme Court assigned me (and a few other judges) to unravel the mess, and to
see that the workers got their day in court. In addition to the approximately
20,000 workers' asbestos cases that I tried as a trial judge, I also sat on the
"State Buildings Asbestos Case" -probably the longest jury trial in state histo-
ry, over six months.5 I have always felt strongly that the judiciary had some-
thing to offer and something to gain by being proactive in problem-solving. I
worked with community leaders to identify appropriate court-community issues.
Our office's probation staff convened public forums, involving representatives
from local churches, schools, law enforcement, civic groups, and the public at
large. University students working as interns for class credit at WVU assisted
with organizing the meetings, prepared the handouts and materials, and often
moderated panels.
We brought together stakeholders and experts to discuss such issues as
juvenile justice, truancy, illegal drug use, sentencing, and mental health. Where
there was demonstrated interest, we created task forces to address the problem
positively. My personal role was to bring people together, and to use the "bully
pulpit" of the court to motivate community leaders to action. Such initiatives in
community involvement are rare in the judicial branch, which has historically
been isolated in public discourse. There are risks whenever one reaches out to
the larger community. But my experience is that familiarity does not breed con-
tempt, but rather confidence and cooperation.
For many years I was an active participant in the Habitat for Humanity
program. I have worked in Preston, Monongalia, Kanawha and Wayne Coun-
ties in West Virginia, and participated in several Jimmy Carter Work Projects,
including Miami, FL; Washington, DC; Kitchner, Ontario; and on a South Da-
kota Sioux Reservation. On three of these projects I had the pleasure of work-
ing side-by-side with President Carter (one of my heroes) and his wife Roslynn.
Another important part of my career has been teaching others. I have
spent every semester since 1993, teaching trial advocacy as an Adjunct Lecturer
at the West Virginia University College of Law. I have taught at programs
sponsored by the West Virginia Judicial Association, the West Virginia State
Bar, Mountain State Bar and other legal organizations. I have lectured and been
a group leader or panelist at the National Judicial College, the Roscoe Pound
Foundation, the Virginia Bar Association, and other law schools. It is hard to
find words to fully express the sense of duty that I feel for teaching. Although
into the new facility; we did it with office staff, inmate labor and a $131.00 rental truck. I inhe-
rited my mom's "cheapskate" gene!)
At Pricketts Fort we built a publicly-owned facility which was estimated to be worth
$80,000.00 for an investment of around $7,000.00. I spent most of my weekends working with
inmates at the Park building that barn for three years.
5 See In re State Pub. Bldg. Asbestos Litig., 454 S.E.2d 413 (W. Va. 1993).
[Vol. I111
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my law students, for example, are adults, I know that they and their loved ones
and families, and society in general, have entrusted their instructors with the job
of helping the students prepare for a demanding career. After more than thirty
years of teaching, I still spend hours preparing for a class or presentation. Any-
thing less than my best effort is unacceptable.
After a 1996 state-wide campaign that I have described as "working
eighteen hours a day, six days a week, for eighteen months," I was nominated
and then elected to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
I joined the Supreme Court in January 1997. In addition to helping de-
cide thousands of cases and writing hundreds of opinions, I exercised adminis-
trative responsibility for budgeting, facilities, program, and personnel manage-
ment-for two years as Chief Justice, and other years in a shared capacity.
At the Supreme Court, I have placed a premium on enhancing the judi-
ciary's relationship with the larger community. When I served as Chief Justice,
I wrote a monthly column on court/community issues for publication in the
State Bar magazine-and a "newspaper version" that was carried by many state
newspapers. In 1999, I convened a Mental Hygiene Task Force to revamp our
state's civil mental illness policy. We brought together doctors, lawyers, gov-
ernment officials, and advocacy groups to develop policies, and we have up-
graded our laws and policies in this area. Although I would never qualify as a
computer expert, I understand that the seemingly immutable practices of dec-
ades in the court system are now in a state of continuous change as a result of
the microchip and the computer screen. In 1999, I convened our state's first
Court Technology Summit. From that event flowed a series of changes that
have transformed our state's judicial system-such as on-demand videoconfe-
rencing, web-based case law, streaming broadcast of internet court sessions,
local online legal research centers, and electronic filing systems.
As an educational project, over the past four years my staff and I have
taken to the road with a historical re-enactment program, "J. R. Clifford and the
Carrie Williams Case," a play about West Virginia's first African American
lawyer.
I have been involved with almost all of the law's many facets. As a trial
judge, I served as a presiding judge in twenty-three of our state's fifty-five
counties, conducted hundreds of jury trials, and decided many thousands of le-
gal disputes. I have sent men and women to prison for life, and I have nurtured
community-based sentencing efforts. From determining the division of assets in
a divorce, to crafting a constitutional test for the delegation of legislative pow-
ers, I have used the tools of precedent and logic, filtered through the practical
psychology that guides much of the law's reasoning, on a daily basis. My life in
the law has given me an informed perspective on human nature-on its potential
for good and evil, for brilliance and stupidity-that is afforded by few discip-
lines. I have seen the majesty of the law; and I have at times seen its pettiness.
It has been an extraordinary experience.
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HI. MY JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: CASE-BY-CASE
In writing signed opinions for the Court, setting forth new Syllabus
Points, I have been able to contribute to our jurisprudence in a number of cases.
In other cases I have sometimes written in concurrence and/or dissent-
sometimes for the purpose of "enhancing the understanding" of a decision in a
direction that is more compatible with my view, and in some cases to try to
"limit the damage" that I believe the majority opinion might do. Following is a
compilation of cases in which I have written that reflects how I see the law-as
it develops, and as it should be applied.
A. Criminal Sentencing and Punishment
In the area of criminal sentencing and punishment, our Court advanced
our jurisprudence in several opinions that I authored. In State v. Lucas,6 the
issue was whether an insurance company that reimbursed a crime victim could
be treated as a "victim" to whom a criminal defendant could be required to pay
restitution. Victims of crimes are usually and justifiably furious. A criminal
sentence that provides for full restitution-if even conceivably possible-can go
a long way toward making something less than "lock them away for life" ac-
ceptable. Because full restitution is often the key to an effective criminal sen-
tence, I was pleased to be able to put specific guidelines in place for our circuit
courts.
Other sentencing- and punishment-related opinions that I wrote include
State v. Sears7 (prohibiting a trial judge from refusing to consider a plea agree-
ment reached after conclusion of pretrial proceedings); Ward v. Cliver8 (requir-
ing findings before dismissing "frivolous" lawsuits by inmates challenging con-
ditions of confinement); State v. Whalen9 (narrowly construing catch-all "sexual
motivation" language in sex offender registration statutes); Black's Auto Repair
and Towing, Inc. v. Monongalia County Magistrate Courtl° (assuring service of
process in civil cases for incarcerated persons).
In some separate opinions, I express my personal opinions about crinmi-
nal sentencing and punishment:
We who have worked daily in the criminal justice system know
what we need to deal with offenders effectively and economi-
cally, and it sure isn't more incarceration. We need more
6 496 S.E.2d 221 (W. Va. 1997).
7 542 S.E.2d 863 (W. Va. 2000).
8 575 S.E.2d 263 (W. Va. 2002).
9 588 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 2003).
10 567 S.E.2d 671 (W. Va. 2002).
[Vol. I111
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treatment programs for drug addicts, and more day reporting
centers and community corrections centers.
We need high-tech home confinement and offender monitoring
systems, and we need a limited amount of secure imprisonment,
with good in-house rehabilitation services, for the violent
people who pose a true danger. We need to get rid of mandato-
ry minimum sentences, because they clog our jails and prisons
with offenders who don't need that level of security.
The sentence in this case of a year in jail for a dog-stealer
means that tens of thousands of dollars of taxpayer money will
go to feed, clothe, house and give medical care to a person who
should be outside, on supervised probation, working, to pay his
debt to society and to his victim.
Multiply this offender's incarceration sentence by hundreds of
other similar cases, and we can see why West Virginia is spend-
ing money that we need-for teachers and nurses and doctors
and roads and bridges and schools-on wasteful, unnecessary
imprisonment.ll
Despite his troubled raising, the defendant had achieved some
real success in overcoming his background. He had completed
his educational goals-and at age 17 he had fulfilled his dream
of enlisting in the United States Army. He had just completed
his basic training at the time of the instant offense.
I completely understand and respect the feelings of the family
of the child victim. I have children, too. At the appellant's sen-
tencing, the child's mother wanted the strongest possible penal-
ty. I understand and respect that feeling. The circuit court
could send the defendant to Anthony Center; and then bring him
back with a full record of his progress or lack thereof-and then
see what the victim's family has to say. Hard feelings often
moderate somewhat over time. 12
9
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I have a suggested answer to the very fair question that is posed
in the dissent [by Justice Maynard]-what to do about jail and
prison overcrowding?
The answer is "work 'em!" Community based sentencing with
offenders repaying society for their wrongs in the form of pub-
lic service is a preferable sentence for a very high percentage of
offenders. Currently taxpayers are being required to pay nearly
$20,000.00 each year for each inmate while the offender sits in
a cell and does nothing beneficial to either the community or
himself.
We are unquestionably wasting a sizable percentage of our full-
time, high-security prison and jail cells on nonviolent offenders
who nearly everyone agrees do not pose a dangerous security
risk. We could, today, put at least 500 checks forgers, drug us-
ers, and other nonviolent offenders who are in state prison and
jails on strict probation, or home confinement, or weekends in
jail. Then we should make them work-at fixing up our public
roads, streets and buildings-to pay for their offenses.
Making offenders work in their own communities to pay for
their crimes is not "soft on crime"-it is tough! 13
B. Criminal Procedure
Important Constitutional protections that are designed to assure a fair
trial are often embodied in the procedural aspects of criminal cases. In several
opinions that I authored the Court articulated standards that will help give de-
fendants a fair trial: State v. Mechling14 (requiring cross-examination of testi-
monial witnesses); State v. Quinn15 (creating a test to determine admissibility of
evidence under the rape shield law); State v. Legg16 (prohibiting unfair mid-trial
changes in the prosecution's theory of the case); State v. Harris17 (giving a nar-
row reading to the "excited utterance" hearsay exception); Choma v. West Vir-
ginia Division of Motor Vehicles' 8 (holding that an acquittal in DUI criminal
13 From an unpublished dissent to the first State ex rel. Berry v. McBride opinion which was
withdrawn, then reheard by the Court. The second Berry opinion was written by me and is cited
at 625 S.E.2d 341 (W. Va. 2005).
14 633 S.E.2d 311 (W. Va. 2006).
15 490 S.E.2d 34 (W. Va. 1997).
16 625 S.E.2d 281 (W. Va. 2005).
17 531 S.E.2d 340 (W. Va. 2000).
18 557 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 2001).
[Vol. I111
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proceedings is relevant in a civil license suspension case); State v. Dews 19 (hold-
ing that a jury in a second offense DUI case is ordinarily not to be told of the
prior offense).
My heightened concern for fair criminal procedure is demonstrated by
some of my remarks in separate opinions about trial procedures:
One could write a dissertation on how Rule 404(b), McGinnis
[193 W.Va. 147, 455 S.E.2d 516 (1994)], and now Edward
Charles L. [183 W.Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990)] have be-
come a "runaway train" in some of our courts, when judges are
tempted to abandon their proper gatekeeper role [to] over-
zealous prosecutors. We have moved far away from the original
purpose for permitting such evidence. The standard now seems
to be: Will it help the prosecutor?
In most cases, as soon as a jury hears about a defendant's prior
sex offense, a defendant is dead meat. Why even have a trial? I
await the day when this Court can stop this runaway train. We
can and will apply common sense to this currently confused
area of law. When that happens, criminal trials in sex offense
cases will be conducted fairly and in accord with the rules of
evidence.2°
Hundreds of years of Anglo-American jurisprudence cannot be
cast aside in the zeal to convict and punish offenders. On a wall
in my chambers is a photograph of several dozen American citi-
zens who were convicted of murder after 1970 or so, sentenced
to die, and later were exonerated and released. One of the les-
sons of this photograph is that juries can be persuaded of a de-
fendant's guilt when in fact the defendant is not guilty. Perhaps
nothing is more persuasive of guilt than evidence of other simi-
lar offenses-that is the way people think. It is precisely for
this reason that our law allows such evidence only for very nar-
row purposes and in exceptional circumstances. We must not
stray from this principle.21
19 549 S.E.2d 694 (W. Va. 2001).
20 State v. Graham, 541 S.E.2d 341, 349-50 (W. Va. 2000) (Starcher, J., concurring).
21 State ex rel. Caton v. Sanders, 601 S.E.2d 75, 84 (W. Va. 2004) (Starcher, J., concurring).
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However, the instant case provides a good example of the rare
instance when Rule 404(b) "other bad acts" evidence should
properly be admitted.
In the instant case, the appellant argued that the court erred in
admitting testimony about a previous domestic abuse incident
involving the appellant, and in admitting testimony about a vio-
lent incident at a Christmas party. However, the evidence of the
prior domestic abuse incident involving a child rebutted the ap-
pellant's claim of accident or mistake. The appellant claimed
that any injury to the child victim in the instant case was acci-
dental and inadvertent. Yet, in the previous incident, the appel-
lant had injured another child, either intentionally or due to a
reckless disregard for the child's safety.
Moreover, the appellant offered evidence tending to show that
he was a person with a good reputation and a good character.
The appellant called neighbors who testified that they were
comfortable with leaving the appellant alone with their children.
The appellant's counsel specifically asked one witness: "Do you
feel comfortable with [the appellant] Jeremiah being around
your children?" The prosecutor, therefore, quite reasonably
presented evidence of the previous incident to show that the ap-




The most notable opinion that I authored in the consumer law area is
State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger.23 As of July 2008, that opinion has nearly 450
Westlaw citations, including 40 reported cases, and had been cited in hundreds
of articles, treatises, and briefs. Dunlap v. Berger dealt with the issue of "man-
datory arbitration" clauses in consumer contracts. Our Court held that boiler-
plate clauses in contracts for consumer goods and services and in everyday em-
ployment contracts cannot prohibit class actions, punitive damages, etc. so as to
effectively deny important consumer rights. The opinion contains a good dis-
cussion of the law of adhesion contracts, and debunks the notion that the Federal
Arbitration Act forbids a substantive look at attempts to strip consumers of their
statutory and constitutional rights. The new syllabus points of Dunlap v. Berger
have (so far) stood the test of time in this area of rapidly-changing law.
22 State v. Mongold, 647 S.E.2d 539, 553-54 (W. Va. 2007) (Starcher, J., concurring).
23 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002).
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Other consumer law opinions that I authored include State ex rel.
McGraw v. Telecheck Services, Inc.24 (allowing preliminary injunctions in con-
sumer cases before a "pattern or practice" is shown); and Bryan v. Big Two Mile
Gas Co.25 (authorizing the termination of gas leases when the lessee acts unrea-
sonably).
Expressions of my thinking in the consumer law area are discernable in
several separate opinions:
Because the many solicitations in the record are patently decep-
tive, misleading, and obviously calculated to unfairly induce
West Virginia consumers to buy cheap merchandise at inflated
prices, the circuit court was correct in granting summary judg-
ment to the Attorney General, awarding injunctive relief against
Suarez, and requiring Suarez to pay back every single consumer
who lost money as a result of receiving one of Suarez's solicita-
26tions.
For at least 128 years, this Court has utilized the common law
to empower trustees to deeds of trust to "do the right thing."
The Court, not the Legislature, required trustees to approach
each deed of trust with an open mind and do the fair thing for
both the lender and the landowner. But the majority opinion's
holding that trustees can only do those acts contained in W. Va.
Code 38-1-3, and no others, overrules centuries of common law,
emasculates trustees and makes them virtual automatons work-
ing at the sole behest of lenders.
In the eyes of the majority opinion, a trustee is powerless to
consider a party's legitimate objections. In other words, if the
duty to consider an objection isn't set out in a statute, then there
is no duty. Forget five centuries of application of the common
law to facts; the majority opinion says that because the Legisla-
ture has spoken on this topic, the common law has ceased to ex-
ist.
The majority opinion is, therefore, a classic example of "dual
personalities." On the one hand, quoting the common law, it
says trustees "may and ought" to do things to remove impedi-
24 582 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 2003).
25 577 S.E.2d 258 (W. Va. 2001).
26 State ex rel. McGraw v. Imperial Mktg., 506 S.E.2d 799, 813 (W. Va. 1998) (Starcher, J.,
concurring).
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ments to a fair sale. On the other hand, it says trustees don't
have to remove impediments to a fair sale because the statute
doesn't explicitly give them the power to do so. If practitioners
of the law come away from the majority opinion confused about
the true responsibilities of a trustee, I wouldn't blame them.27
If a contractor adds inflated processing charges and thereby rips
off a subcontractor, and then the contractor puts the money in
his "IRA" account-is the subcontractor barred from getting to
the money, just because it is stashed it in an "IRA?" I think that
the due process, open courts/certain remedy, and takings clauses
of the West Virginia Constitution protect the subcontractor's
right to get the money back, whatever the Legislature may say.
And I doubt that the Legislature intended to allow a debtor to
hide money from legitimate creditors, by just putting that mon-
ey in an account and calling it an "IRA."
There are many, many kinds of bank accounts, certificates of
deposit, etc. that one can call an "IRA." It remains to be seen
whether they can be used to avoid paying one's just debts.
These issues are something that we may have to thrash out in
the proper case.28
D. Employment Law
In Sheetz, Inc. v. Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, PLLC, an em-
ployment law case, I enunciated the important principle of requiring unitary
trials whenever possible, to resolve all of the claims among the parties.29 I be-
lieve that "polyfurcated" trials can very often give an unfair advantage to defen-
dants-those with greater resources can afford to drag out litigation to "wear
out" a plaintiff, either with time taken or actual economic costs. I also discussed
in Sheetz why "the advice of counsel" is at best a limited defense in employment
law cases, saying "Simply put, an attorney is not an immunity machine.,
30
Other examples of my writing for the Court in the employment law area
include: Stanley v. Department of Tax Revenue31 (authorizing reasonable per-
27 Lucas v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 618 S.E.2d 488, 499-500, 503 (W. Va. 2005) (Starcher, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
28 Burge v. Fortney, 624 S.E.2d 487, 493 (W. Va. 2005) (Starcher, J., concurring).
29 See Syllabus Point 4, Sheetz, v. Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, PLLC, 547 S.E.2d
256, 260 (W. Va. 2001).
30 Id. at 327.
31 614 S.E.2d 712 (W. Va. 2005).
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employee fee awards in employment discrimination cases); Travis v. Alcon La-
boratories, Inc.32 (defining the elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in an employment case); Stone v. St. Joseph's Hospital of Parkersburg
33
(holding that persons perceived as having a disability have legal protection);
Barthelemy v. West Virginia Division of Corrections, Pruntytown Correctional
Center34 (applying the discovery rule to grievances); Haynes v. Rhone-Poulenc,
Inc.35 (pregnancy can be a temporary disability with entitlement to legal protec-
tion); State ex rel. United Mine Workers of America, Local Union 1938 v. Wa-
ters36 (requiring a hearing to resolve NLRB preemption issues); Russell v. Bush
& Burchett, Inc. 37 (workers on state-funded projects should be protected by
West Virginia law); Nutter v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.38 (setting out the burden of
proof and evidentiary requirements in deliberate intention workplace injury cas-
es).
Here are some remarks about employment law taken from my separate
opinions:
It's not as "easy" to be an employer as it once was. Under mod-
em employment discrimination law, employers must follow a
number of "non-intuitive" rules about when they can and can't
fire people. Behavior that was once normal or tolerated is now
intolerable. Employment discrimination lawsuits are at best a
blunt and imprecise instrument to change behavior. But they
are working, and are an important part of changing the
workplace for the better.39
I am deeply concerned that the broad scope of Syllabus Point 4
would permit private sector employers to penalize and chill an
individual's exercise of fundamental democratic rights.
For example, Syllabus Point 4 would allow a restaurant to fire
an excellent chef who has no problems at work, for writing a
letter to the newspaper in favor of campaign finance reform---or
32 504 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1998).
33 538 S.E.2d 389 (W. Va. 2000).
34 535 S.E.2d 200 (W. Va. 2000).
35 521 S.E.2d 331 (W. Va. 1999).
36 489 S.E.2d 266 (W. Va. 1997).
37 559 S.E.2d 36 (W. Va. 2001).
38 550 S.E.2d 398 (W. Va. 2001).
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of better wages for chefs! Or, a taxi company could fire a driv-
er with a 20-year spotless record, because she or he called in to
a radio talk show to support a woman's freedom of choice-or
to call for stricter abortion laws....
What if a maliciously anti-union person or entity compiled and
circulated a clandestine "blacklist" of known pro-union workers
to employers, with the hope and intent of interfering with and
injuring these workers in their employment relationships? If the
list was accurate and contained only "truthful information," the
compiler and circulator of the list (under the protection of Syl-
labus Point 5 of the majority opinion) would have no liability
for tortious interference, even if the circulation of the list ac-
complished the circulator's intent of causing grievous harm to
the workers and their families. 4°
It is notable that the Prevailing Wage Act contains other lan-
guage evidencing a legislative intent that public employees who
are constructing public improvements should be paid prevailing
wages. W.Va. Code, 21-5A-8 [1961] says that "[t]he contractor
and each subcontractor or the officer of the public authority in
charge of the construction of a public improvement shall keep
an accurate record showing the names and occupations of all
such skilled laborers, workmen, and mechanics employed by
them, in connection with the construction on the public im-
provement. . . ." Clearly, in this instance the statute contem-
plates covering employees of the public authority.
The Legislature has made a commendable effort to help insure
that all working people in West Virginia will earn a decent
wage when constructing public improvements.
The majority opinion defies the legislative intent and denies that
decent wage to an important class of workers, West Virginia's
public employees. I dissent to this improper, unfair, and mean-
spirited result.41
40 Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578, 596, 599 (W. Va. 1998)
(Starcher, J., concurring and dissenting).
41 State ex rel. Tucker County Solid Waste Auth. v. W. Va. Dep't of Labor, W. Va. State Bldg.
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E. Environment
In the area of environmental law, I have tried to emphasize accountabili-
ty on the part of all stakeholders, as illustrated by my comments in the following
separate opinions:
In its 1995 reorganization, Allegheny Power employed "smoke
and mirrors"-an illusion done on paper-so that it could oper-
ate as a single utility company, but claim it was a conglomerate
of small, independent companies .... Allegheny Power smiles
and says "none of your business-we're not a public utility
company."
The result is that Allegheny Power gets the milk without having
to buy the cow-it gets to drink in profits from selling electrici-
ty to the citizens of West Virginia, without having to submit its
activities to the scrutiny of the Public Service Commission.
This is wrong, because in this case, the illusion has concrete,
permanent, and in my judgment, devastating consequences for
the people of this State. I therefore dissent.
The pleadings and record indicate that the appellee Kingwood
Coal is a subsidiary of a large national energy company, the
Coastal Corporation. Kingwood Coal bought Kingwood Min-
ing, a company which chose to acquire coal for the purpose of
mining it, and selected a company (T & T) to carry out coal ex-
traction. Kingwood Mining received, processed and sold al-
most all of the coal as it was mined. Like the majority opinion,
I would make the assumption that Kingwood Coal bought
Kingwood Mining's liabilities and responsibilities, as well as its
assets.
Now Kingwood Coal, a subsidiary of a large national corpora-
tion, disclaims any responsibility for the creation of what the
pleadings indicate may be one of the worst long-term acid mine
drainage sites created in this state since the passage of the Sur-
face Mine Reclamation and Control Act twenty years ago.
42 W. Va. Highlands Conservancy. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 527 S.E.2d 495, 504 (W.
Va. 1998) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, the pleadings indicate that because T & T Coal is
bankrupt, the State of West Virginia is currently paying in the
neighborhood of $60,000 per month to treat the acid mine drai-
nage that is flowing from the mine void left by the mining of
the coal.
I am concerned that our ruling may have the effect of shielding
Kingwood Coal from long-term liability for the financial and
environmental consequences of its chosen economic activity.
This sort of immunity distorts the market, and unfairly penalizes
coal operators and companies who do accept responsibility for
the long-term effects of their economic activity.43
History shows us that the ownership of land is a powerful right,
worthy of exceptional legal protection. Land is "the art of de-
mocracy" which every man "can shape in his own image." For
centuries, courts and legislatures have adopted a vast penumbra
of rules designed to protect each person's right to freely use his
or her property without interference from others.
The Public Service Commission has followed this historical
tradition and adopted regulations dedicated to ensuring that
public utilities fairly use their land without unduly imposing
upon the rights of neighboring landowners.
I dissent because the Public Service Commission, and now the
majority opinion, have decided that the formally adopted regu-
lations of the Commission are more like "guidelines" than "ac-
tual rules."
I think that the Commission has a duty to fully take into account
the effect of the turbines on the property values of the adjoining
and nearby landowners and communities.... It is not enough to
say, as the majority implies, that those landowners can file a
nuisance suit in the future."
43 W. Va. Div. of Envtl. Prot. v. Kingwood Coal Co., 490 S.E.2d 823, 843-44 (W. Va. 1997)
(Starcher, J., dissenting).
4 Mountain Cmtys. for Responsible Energy v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va. et al., 665
S.E.2d 315, 332 (W. Va. 2008) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 111
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F. Insurance
I have written a number of opinions about insurance and insurance cov-
erage. Because of the substantial advantages that insurance companies have
over individuals in the sale of insurance and in the responses made to policy
holders when claims are filed, and in the resources of the respective parties, the
law tends to hold this industry to a rather strict standard of review. Some of the
opinions I have authored include: Gibson v. Northfield Insurance Co.45 (holding
that defense costs are not included in liability coverage limits, and that limits on
government entity insurance must be disclosed and agreed to); Colonial Insur-
ance Co. v. Barrett46 (holding that notice of a claim can be given to the insurer
by someone other than the insured); Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tucker
47
(holding that a "household" may include people living in more than one build-
ing); Marlin v. Wetzel County Board of Education48 (holding that a certificate of
insurance may give rise to an estoppel); Adkins v. Meador49 (holding that "use
of a vehicle" is broader than "occupying"); State ex rel. West Virginia Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Karl5 ° (holding that court approval is not required for all infant
settlements); Miller v. Fluharty51 (defining the insurer's duty of investigation for
first-party claims).
One notable insurance law opinion that I authored is Columbia Casualty
Co. v. Westfield Ins. Co.,52 where our Court answered a certified question from
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. In Columbia
Casualty, two lawsuits were filed against a jail as a result of inmate suicides.
The jail's insurance companies claimed that liability insurance coverage for the
jail did not apply to the deaths, citing an "intentional injury" exclusion. We
held that the jail did have insurance coverage.53
Another notable insurance opinion that I wrote was Farmers and Me-
chanics Mutual Insurance Co. of West Virginia v. Cook.54 In this case, an insur-
ance company denied a defense and liability coverage to a woman who was
(allegedly) defending herself, and killed a neighbor. We held in Farmers and
45 631 S.E.2d 598 (W. Va. 2005).
46 542 S.E.2d 869 (W. Va. 2000).
47 576 S.E.2d 261 (W. Va. 2002).
48 569 S.E.2d 462 (W. Va. 2002).
49 494 S.E.2d 915 (W. Va. 1997).
50 487 S.E.2d 336 (W. Va. 1997).
51 500 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1997).
52 617 S.E.2d 797 (W. Va. 2005).
53 See also Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 509 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1998) (homeowners
"all risk" insurance could cover landslide if partially caused by non-natural events); Erie Ins.
Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Stage Show Pizza, Inc., 553 S.E.2d 257 (W. Va. 2001) (insurance company
has a duty to defend employer sued by employee under common law theories despite "workers'
compensation" exception where the employer failed to pay workers' compensation premiums).
54 557 S.E.2d 801 (W. Va. 2001).
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Mechanics that whether Cook intended her neighbor's death was a question of
fact; and that even if she had intended the death and acted in self-defense, the
"intentional acts" exclusion did not apply.
Some of my language in separate opinions about insurance companies
sounds a little "tough":
This case is another example of the axiom that "what the big
print giveth, the small print taketh away." As former Justice
Neely eloquently stated, "In most insurance cases, the plaintiffs
pay for and believe they have insurance, to discover only after
disaster strikes, no insurance. The insurer has the plaintiffs'
money and after the disaster-fire, death or accident-informs
the plaintiffs that no insurance covers the fire, death or acci-
dent."55
In the instant case, the policyholders bought two policies
on two cars. They paid premiums on a "per-vehicle" basis. Yet
State Farm now wants to pay benefits on a "per-person" basis,
pointing to an exclusion which prohibits stacking the coverage
bought on each vehicle.
An argument I hear repeatedly to support such practices is that
insurance companies are struggling to comply with our State's
laws, and simply can't profitably survive with this Court's in-
terpretation of those laws. The argument is always posed that
the decisions of this Court are going to bankrupt insurance
companies.
I have one response: hogwash. In its 2000 Annual Report To
State Farm Mutual Policyholders, State Farm made it patently
clear that it can make a hefty profit from selling insurance poli-
cies. The report, available on the Internet at
www.statefarm.com, indicates that State Farm has roughly $78
billion-that's billion, with a "b"---dollars worth of assets. By
any assessment, this company is a financial monster.56
The plaintiff-passenger in this case paid for protection against
bodily injuries that might be caused by an underinsured driver.
55 Mitchell v. Broadnax, 537 S.E.2d 882, 896 (W. Va. 2000) (Starcher, J., concurring).
56 Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Fox, 550 S.E.2d 388, 393 (W. Va. 2001) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
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As fate would have it, that underinsured driver was her hus-
band. Our automobile insurance laws mandate that underinsured
motorist protection follow the plaintiff-passenger wherever she
goes, but State Farm's exclusion is blatantly contrary to that sta-
tutory mandate.
State Farm's policy language is contrary to the statute, and de-
nies the plaintiff that for which she bargained and paid. I there-
fore respectfully dissent.57
G. Torts & The Common Law
For hundreds of years before legislatures began "sticking their oar in the
water" to help figure out where justice can be found in disputes between parties,
courts have been applying, updating, and revising the common law and tort law
to resolve these disputes. In general, the common law system has worked quite
well, and it is my continuing sense that the careful development of the common
law needs to be guarded from excessive legislative intrusion.
Writing for our Court, I authored a number of opinions dealing with the
common law and tort law: Phillips v. Larry's Drive-In Pharmacy, Inc.58 (ambi-
guous statutes are to be interpreted as making the least change in the common
law); Hinchman v. Gillette59 (construing notice provisions in medical malprac-
tice statute); McDavid v. United States. (allowing estate to collect for a dece-
dent's pre-death pain and suffering); Foster v. City of Keyser6l (modernizing res
ipsa loquitur, placing "high duty of care" on transporters of dangerous sub-
stance). Also see Rowe v. Sisters of Pallottine Missionary Society62 (holding
that the fact that a patient's negligence caused his initial injury is not a factor in
assessing comparative negligence of a subsequent health care provider); Brad-
shaw v. Soulsby63 (defining elements of the "discovery rule" as applied to
wrongful death actions); Gaither v. City Hospital, Inc.64 (defining the "discov-
ery rule" as applied to the statute of limitations in tort actions).
Following is some language discussing the common law from my sepa-
rate opinions:
57 Cantrell v. Cantrell, 582 S.E.2d 819, 826 (W. Va. 2003) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
58 647 S.E.2d 920 (W. Va. 2007).
59 618 S.E.2d 387 (W. Va. 2005).
60 584 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2003).
61 501 S.E.2d 165 (W. Va. 1997).
62 560 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 2001).
63 558 S.E.2d 681 (W. Va. 2001).
64 487 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1997).
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When Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes spoke of "fixed and uni-
form standards of external conduct" in his 1881 lecture series
(now found in The Common Law (1909)), we must keep in
mind that Holmes was writing in a time when the harsh rules of
contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow-
servant doctrine were taking root in the law. These rules, which
were once new, shiny principles designed to immunize entre-
preneurs and businesses from liability at a time of early indu-
strialization, have since weathered and fallen in the face of time,
reason, and a growing intolerance for human suffering that has
accompanied the post-industrial era.
Applying these principles to the instant case, rarely are the dis-
tinctions between licensee, invitee and trespasser proven "to
have determined the conduct of the litigants." A licensee is a
person who enters onto property with permission; an invitee en-
ters onto property with permission for some pecuniary or busi-
ness benefit to the landowner; and a trespasser enters on land
without any permission whatsoever. A landowner owes no duty
to a licensee or trespasser, but owes a duty of due care to an in-
vitee. I agree that a landowner doesn't owe a trespasser the
time of day. I have a right to assume people will obey the law
and not trespass onto my land; therefore, I don't owe a trespass-
er any duty whatsoever (except to not intentionally cause harm).
But I fail to understand why the invitee-licensee distinction
should continue to exist, primarily because I don't think lan-
downers manage their property with these common-law status
distinctions in mind. The invitee-licensee rule creates the fic-
tional premise that a social visitor to a home walks across a
lawn with full knowledge that they do so at their own peril, but
a babysitter, mail carrier, taxi driver, garbage collector, delive-
ryman, paperboy or meter reader walking in the social visitor's
footsteps may feel safe in the knowledge that he or she can re-
cover from the homeowner their damages for any negligently
caused injury.65
It is axiomatic that both the Legislature and the Court are con-
stitutionally empowered to alter the common law. Courts
amend the common law narrowly and incrementally, on a case-
by-case basis and usually over many years. But the Legislature,
65 Self v. Queen, 487 S.E.2d 295, 299-301 (W. Va. 1997) (Starcher, J., concurring).
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when changing the common law, often makes drastic statutory
changes in response to real or perceived crises, and often with-
out a clear understanding of the impact those changes might
have on individual cases. When the crises pass or are proven il-
lusory, the Legislature is rarely impelled to repeal the statutes,
and so statutes sometimes exist that address a non-existent
problem. This means that cookie-cutter Legislative enactments
intended to "fix" a problem with the common law often end up
creating absurd conundrums--or worse, end up trampling upon
constitutional rights-when applied to facts in a courtroom.66
H. Parents, Children, and Families
In this important area of the law, my writings reflect that I am protective
of children and parents from the power of the State, that I abhor family violence,
and that I am forgiving when a woman, in self protection, injures or kills an
abusive spouse. Opinions that I have authored include: Katherine B. T. v. Jack-
son 67 (a child may ask for a domestic violence protective order); State v. Kirk
68N. (parents are not separate and independent parties in a juvenile proceeding);
State v. Damian R.69 (establishing due process requirements for transfer of a
child to state custody); In re George Glen B., Jr.7 ° (termination of parental rights
requires a showing of actual current abuse or neglect); State ex rel. West Virgin-
ia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, Child Support Enforcement Div. v.
Michael George K.7' (natural father may have a duty to support child even
though another person was named as the father on the birth certificate).
As a judge, I have sometimes described myself as a "social worker with
clout." Here are some excerpts from separate opinions that express my thinking
and feelings in this area:
The circuit judge in this case went to great lengths to protect the
welfare of a very troubled family. The mother is a drug addict;
the father committed a crime allegedly to "feed his family."
The mother is in and out of rehab; the father is stuck in a federal
prison until the end of the year. And in the middle, two young
children are growing up very quickly.
66 Blankenship v. Ethicon, Inc., 656 S.E.2d 451, 460 (W. Va. 2007) (Starcher, J., concurring
and dissenting).
67 640 S.E.2d 569, 575-76 (W. Va. 2006).
68 591 S.E.2d 288, 295 (W. Va. 2003)
69 591 S.E.2d 168, 177 (W. Va. 2003).
70 532 S.E.2d 64, 69 (W. Va. 2000).
71 531 S.E.2d 669 (W. Va. 2000).
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In looking at the facts in this case the judge did the best he
could with the situation as presented to the court. It appears that
the mother is so wrapped up in her addiction that she does not
provide care for the children. The father, however, seems to re-
gret his actions and is struggling to maintain a relationship with
the children. He regularly visits with the children in a prison vi-
siting room, plays with them, talks, and inquires about their
well-being. Beyond that, there isn't much he can do from the
confines of prison except count the days....
The goal of abuse and neglect proceedings is to protect children
from severe physical and emotional trauma, and to provide
every child with long-term stability. While we may not be able
to provide every child with the perfect, white bread, cookie-
cutter childhood replete with sitcom-like suburban experiences,
the court system must fashion a solution that provides protec-
tion for children, with a reasonable opportunity to reach adult-
hood safely and in as good physical and mental health as prac-
ticable. And this opportunity may include permitting a father
who has been incarcerated for a crime to continue to parent his
children.72
I am concerned that the majority opinion has, in effect, applied
a bright-line rule: unless a parent who abuses their child admits
to the abuse, and unless the other parent accuses the "abuser
parent" of abuse, neither parent will ever be the child's parent
again....
But it seems to me to be unreasonable to assume that parents
who can't or won't "fess up" or make an accusation regarding
abuse can't ever become and behave as acceptable parents.
Nothing in our statutes says that this is a judgment that the Leg-
islature has made, and I don't think this is an accepted principle
of social science. So how can we make this the premise of such
a harsh rule, a rule that certainly will have the effect of tearing
some children away from basically loving and caring parents,
and placing these children into the highly problematic worlds of
foster care and adoption?
73
72 In re Emily, 540 S.E.2d 542, 562 (W. Va. 2000) (Starcher, J., concurring).
73 In re Taylor B., 491 S.E.2d 607,617-618 (W. Va. 1997) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
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When circuit judges determine that a child is neglected, or that
parental rights be terminated, the decisions of this court often
(and in my view quite properly) state that in these difficult cases
we must give deference to the circuit court's perception and
weighing of the evidence. Why? Because the judges see the
people involved. The judges get a sense and feel of the situation
and can size it up. Is this parent well-meaning and trying?
Could the parent, with enough support, do a decent job? Look
at the child-is it really fair to say that the child is neglected? Is
it really fair to say that the parent is an abuser? Is it fair to sepa-
rate a child from a parent, even when limited parenting skills
are obvious? It's a tough call to make such determinations, and
I think that it's a call that requires a face-to-face look at the
people involved, to be done well.
But when circuit judges say-based on the same sorts of as-
sessments-that a child should not be found to be neglected, or
that parental rights should not be terminated, that the court
should give the parent-child relationship another chance-then I
sense that our decisions too often tend to find reasons why we
shouldn't defer to or trust the circuit judge's judgment.74
I am a firm believer that violence is an unacceptable parenting
technique. No child should live in fear of physical or emotional
injury from a parent. As a society, we expect responsible adults
to refrain from violence when dealing with other adults; we
should also expect responsible parents to refrain from violence
or threats of violence toward their own children. As Mohandas
Gandhi once said, "I object to violence because when it appears
to do good, the good is only temporary; the evil it does is per-
manent." Mr. Powell, and other parents just like him, must un-
derstand that threatening or battering a child will not be tole-
rated in a civil society....
But I also believe in the power of contrition. Mr. Powell has
admitted his error, he has paid a serious price for his error, and
no other misconduct involving students has been raised, let
alone proven. On this record, the actions of the State Superin-
tendent appear more like "piling it on," dishing out penalties
that bear little relationship to the offense. Suspending Mr. Pow-
74 State v. Julie G., 500 S.E.2d 877, 888 (W. Va. 1997) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
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ell from teaching for four years, when there was no evidence he
was unfit to teach, carried too much a load of unfairness.75
To me, the instant case is not about "self-defense." It is about
the right of a mother to protect her child, and the right of a
homeowner to stop a criminal from committing a violent crime
in her home.
Valerie Whittaker shot a man who had brutally beaten her many
times, and who came into her home in violation of a court order
and feloniously attacked her daughter. Her response was what, I
believe, most people would like to have the courage to do. Un-
der these undisputed facts, I would simply reverse Ms. Whittak-
er's conviction. The evidence in this case permitted only one re-
sult-justifiable homicide in the defense of a child and the sanc-
tity of the home. The jury should have been so directed.76
L Workers' Compensation
People who are injured in connection with their work lose most or all of
their legal rights to hold their employers "accountable." In return for that loss,
these injured persons should have a speedy and adequate alternative remedy.
Instead, they often get a slow and inadequate remedy-and too often, rejection.
In several opinions in the workers' compensation area that I wrote, I felt
that our Court was making a modest advancement in the law at the time, howev-
er incremental: Skaggs v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp.77 (termination of
worker for accepting workers' rehabilitative benefits was actionable); State ex
rel. McKenzie v. Smith78 (claimants may not be required to use "company doc-
tors" for rehabilitation).
However, in general, I have come to feel that our Court has improperly
abandoned its duty to protect the rights of working people, as reflected by the
following language from separate opinions:
What especially concerns me is that a public official files a
number of lawsuits in 1998, and the same public official then
dismisses the suits in 1999. In doing so, the action goes a long
way toward immunizing the public official's former business
75 Powell v. Paine, 655 S.E.2d 204, 212 (W. Va. 2007) (Starcher, J., concurring).
76 State v. Whittaker, 650 S.E.2d 216, 236 (W. Va. 2007) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
77 569 S.E.2d 769, 777 (W. Va. 2002).
78 569 S.E.2d 809, 820 (W. Va. 2002).
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colleagues from any attempt by a future administration to col-
lect these debts.
What a blow to West Virginia workers! What a sweet deal for
the coal companies that made a fortune using contract mining
companies! And what a sour deal for the West Virginia busi-
nesses-including responsible coal companies-that played by
the rules, and paid their fair share of workers' compensation
premiums!
Finally, what a stain on the public face of government! It just
looks terrible for a former coal company executive to spearhead
a move that has the effect of giving his former business col-
leagues immunity from civil liability.79
The facts of this case demonstrate, in a nutshell, why our work-
ers' compensation system is on financially tenuous ground. A
historical problem in West Virginia has been the use by em-
ployers of "shell" corporations which are created, pay little or
no workers' compensation premiums, and then go out of busi-
ness a year or two later. The Workers' Compensation Commis-
sioner and companies that do pay their compensation premiums
are then left to foot the bill for injured workers. Shortly thereaf-
ter, the first shell corporation is replaced by another shell corpo-
ration with the same corporate officers using the same equip-
ment and same employees to do the same work, and the cycle
repeats itself endlessly.
The Legislature has tried to fix this problem. I dissent because
the majority opinion undoes the Legislature's work, and strips
the Workers' Compensation Commissioner of the statutory au-
thority to put the workers' compensation system back on the
right financial track and make all employers pay their fair
share.
80
79 State ex rel. Affiliated Const. Trades Found. v. Vieweg, 520 S.E.2d 854, 875 (W. Va. 1999)
(Starcher, J., dissenting).
80 IPI, Inc. v. Burton, 617 S.E.2d 531, 538 (W. Va. 2005) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
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[Tihe majority opinion sets West Virginia's workers' compen-
sation and common law on a course that is almost wholly dif-
ferent from that of every other state in the nation. Arthur and
Lex Larsons' Larson's Workers' Compensation Law-the lead-
ing summary of the nationwide state of workers' compensation
law since the 1950s-makes it clear that workers' compensation
is a tit-for-tat, quid pro quo system: the employee gives up a
common law cause of action only when it is replaced with a sta-
tutory workers' compensation remedy. If there is no quid pro
quo within the workers' compensation system to counter a
worker's loss of the right to sue, then states allow the worker to
proceed with a common law tort action. The majority opinion
ignores the leading scholars on this issue, and charts a different
course....
I was troubled to also find in the majority's opinion a rewriting
of science and rewriting of history. The majority opinion sug-
gests that the mental injury incurred by the plaintiff, Berchie
Eugene Bias, was a mere trifle because it "occurr[ed] within a
period of 90 minutes or so ... when plaintiff was trapped in a
smoky environment within a mine." The majority opinion then
distinguishes Mr. Bias's injury from that of the plaintiff in
Jones v. Rinehart & Dennis, because Mr. Bias's injury "was not
at all similar to the slowly developing disease at issue in Jones."
First, modem medical science shows that traumatic stress dis-
orders are, in fact, a physical injury. The shock of a terrifying
event-like a rape, a robbery at gunpoint, or fearing death by
suffocation when lost in the smoky darkness of a mine for nine-
ty minutes-triggers chemical reactions in the brain that mea-
surably scar and injure nerve tissue. The brain is actually, phys-
ically "re-wired" and injured. To somehow suggest that the in-
jury to the plaintiff's brain is different from the lung injury that
suffocated the decedent in Jones reflects a primitive, out-dated
view of science.
The majority opinion reflects a disdain for the extreme fear of
death that coal miners like Mr. Bias face on a daily basis-a fear
that has become all-too-real this year-and the disabling effect
that fear can have on a miner's psyche. So far, in 2006, at least
thirty-three miners have died in America on the job, nineteen of
them in West Virginia. In January, twelve miners died at the
Sago mine after an explosion, eleven of them by suffocation
waiting for rescue. Less than three weeks later, two miners suf-
focated after a fire at the Aracoma Alma No. 1 Mine, when the
[Vol. I111
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miners became lost in the smoke. In May, three miners survived
an explosion at the Darby Mine No. 1 in eastern Kentucky only
to die of carbon monoxide poisoning waiting in the smoke for
rescue. It pains me to hear of these deaths, and then read the
majority opinion's callous treatment of Mr. Bias's claims.
8 '
J. Mental Illness
Mental illness is far too easily shoved to the side-in our courts, and in
our general society. For this reason, I have actively attempted to expound con-
structively on this subject, when given the opportunity. In State ex rel., Walker
v. Mental Hygiene Commissioners,82 I wrote:
The events leading to a mental hygiene commitment to a psy-
chiatric hospital are dangerous, traumatic, and frightening.
Every mental hygiene "pickup order" is an occasion of heigh-
tened risk for law enforcement. A mental hygiene commitment
is not a "tune-up." It is a crisis situation-for the ill person, for
their family and loved ones, and for all of the other participants
in the process.
83
Today, for most patients, modem medications-if taken as pre-
scribed (a big "if," see below)-can prevent many of the most
dangerous symptoms of severe mental illness; can bring acute
episodes of psychosis to an end in a relatively short time; and
can reduce or often eliminate the need for hospitalization. How-
ever, many individuals with severe mental illnesses, as a result
of their illness and through no fault of their own, have dimi-
nished insight into the need to adhere to a medication regime.
Many experts feel that the most pressing current public health
challenge in the area of mental illness treatment is obtaining
better prescribed medication compliance by individuals with
severe, chronic mental illnesses.... Discussing such individu-
als, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently said in In Re
Dennis H., 255 Wis.2d 359, 386, 647 N.W.2d 851, 863-64
(2002):
By permitting intervention before a mentally ill person's condi-
tion becomes critical, the legislature has enabled the mental
81 Bias v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 640 S.E.2d 540, 551, 553-54 (W. Va. 2006) (Starcher, J.,
dissenting). The Jones v. Rhinehart & Dennis case referenced in the block quotation may be
located at 168 S.E.2d 482 (W. Va. 1933).
82 614 S.E.2d 727 (W. Va. 2005).
83 Id. at 735 n. 18.
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health treatment community to break the cycle associated with
incapacity to choose medication or treatment, restore the person
to a relatively even keel, prevent serious and potentially cata-
strophic harm, and ultimately reduce the amount of time spent
in an institutional setting. This type of "prophylactic interven-
tion" does not violate substantive due process. 84
Also see Syllabus Point 4, Smith v. West Virginia Human Rights Com-
mission,85 which found that depression can be a cognizable disability under the
State Human Rights Act.
In a number of separate opinions I wrote about mental illness:
First, the Court in Syllabus Point 1 of Smith v. Animal Urgent
Care reached the conclusion that "purely mental or emotional
harm that arises from a claim of sexual harassment and lacks
physical manifestation does not fall within a definition of 'bodi-
ly injury' which is limited to 'bodily injury, sickness, or dis-
ease."' Frankly, this is an archaic conceptualization of human
anatomy and physiology, based on a belief that there is a dis-
tinction between "mental" and "physical" injuries. The science
of today establishes that the brain can be physically injured
solely through emotional disturbance. A traumatizing event can
trigger severe chemical reactions in the brain, such that a tangi-
ble injury to the brain can occur. Ask any combat veteran about
post-traumatic stress disorder, or any doctor who treats that vet-
eran-they will tell you that intense stress can cause the brain to
be "rewired."
In other words, in the past when we said someone was "emo-
tionally scarred" by an event, it might have been closer to the
truth than we knew.
So when this Court said in Smith v. Animal Urgent Care that
psychological injuries caused by sexual harassment were not
bodily injuries, that conclusion ignored modem science and ig-
nored the physical, chemical aspects of psychological injuries.
If a record of medical evidence were presented on this point to
the Court, perhaps to folly of Smith v. Animal Urgent Care
might be recognized.86
84 Id. at 739 n. 18.
85 602 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 2004).
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I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment. I write separately
to point out that the father in this case, Bobby F., has been di-
agnosed with schizophrenia and was not taking his prescribed
medication.
Schizophrenia, a serious neurological brain disorder, strikes one
out of one hundred people worldwide, with the usual onset of
symptoms coming between the ages of 13 and 25. Like di-
abetes, there is no cure--only treatment, which is basically me-
dication to relieve the symptoms of psychosis, disorganized
thoughts, etc. The cause of schizophrenia is unknown, although
there is some genetic-based component. Some of my best
friends have adult children with schizophrenia.
Many people with schizophrenia "do well" if they consistently
take prescribed medicine. (However, a substantial percentage,
unfortunately, do not do well, despite the best treatment.) But
many people with schizophrenia have a substantially dimi-
nished or no appreciation of the fact that they have an illness.
These people often do not take prescribed medications, through
no fault of their own.
The consequences of schizophrenia for patients, families, and
our society-particularly untreated schizophrenia-are enorm-
ous. Most people with the illness are cared for by their families;
many others are isolated and/or homeless. For many family
members and other treatment and care providers, getting a per-
son who has schizophrenia to "voluntarily" take their medicine
can be a very difficult--or impossible-task. The result is often
a spiral into psychosis and expensive involuntary hospitaliza-
tion.
Fortunately, new laws like "Kendra's Law" in New York have
drastically reduced episodes of psychosis, violence, and home-
lessness among non-compliant patients-by using court orders
and assertive community treatment as a less-restrictive alter-
native, to encourage patients with schizophrenia to take pre-
scribed medicine.
In the instant case, the whole sorry series of events might have
been avoided if Bobby F. had been required by a court order to
take his prescribed medicine.
2009]
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I pray that we will soon implement better laws in West Virginia
to help health care providers and families and patients like Bob-
by F. and his children.
87
K. We The Jury
As a trial judge, I conducted hundreds of jury trials. Because I have a
great respect for our Anglo-American tradition of having justice meted out by
groups of ordinary citizens, I have written frequently on the jury system.
For the Court, I wrote Evans v. Mutual Mining88 (jury may hear opinion
testimony from the owner about the value of his personal property); Jackson v.
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. 89 (whether insurance company reasona-
bly investigated and evaluated liability is ordinarily a jury question); State v.
Thompson9° (judge may not injure a party's case by demonstrating partiality
before the jury); State v. Keaton9' (judge should not ordinarily converse with
jury off the record and without counsel present) (imposing strict requirements in
the testimony of judges before juries); State v. Shabazz92 (magistrates should
only converse with juries in the presence of counsel and on the record).
One of the jury law opinions that I take particular pride in authoring for
the Court is O'Dell v. Miller.93 In this case, we went a long way toward arresting
a trend in the lower courts to "rehabilitate" prospective jurors who had clearly
indicated the presence of a disqualifying prejudice or bias. I was assisted in
writing O'Dell by the late Janie Peyton, Esq., who served as my law clerk from
May 2001 to November 2005. She was a smart, funny woman, and I and her
co-workers miss her very much.
My strong support for our jury system is expressed in the following
statement from a separate opinion:
I am a stout believer in and defender of democracy, and I be-
lieve that juries are as pure a representation of direct democracy
as you can have in our republic. The members of a jury-like
our elected representatives-must be ready to render service
with an open mind, ready to recognize their predispositions but
ready to set them aside when they are in conflict with the facts
or the law. But when a person expresses a clear prejudice
against one party, or a clear bias in favor of certain theories or
87 In re Tiffany P., 600 S.E.2d 334, 339-340 (W. Va. 2004) (Starcher, J., concurring).
88 485 S.E.2d 695, 699-700 (W. Va. 1997).
89 600 S.E.2d 346, 353 (W. Va. 2004).
90 647 S.E.2d 834, 846 (W. Va. 2007).
91 599 S.E.2d 799, 807 (W. Va. 2004).
92 526 S.E.2d 521, 523 (W. Va. 1999).
93 565 S.E.2d 407 (W. Va. 2002).
[Vol. I111
32
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 111, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss2/6
2009] A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: PEOPLE-ORIENTED JUSTICE 443
forms of evidence, and does nothing to reflect on the possible
folly of holding the prejudice or bias regardless of the facts,
then the person has no business being qualified as a juror. Cir-
cuit judges must, above all else, preserve the integrity and vi-
tality of the jury system by seating only those prospective jurors
who demonstrate-by plain expression rather than recitation of
a "magic phrase"--clear impartiality.
94
L. Gotcha!
One theme that can be found in many of my opinions is to favor the res-
olution of issues on their merits. I look skeptically on the claims of parties who
seek to either impose or escape liability purely for procedural reasons-what I
call "Gotcha!" justice. Here are some examples of how I have expressed this
view:
The statute of limitations can sometimes help a person who
stops doing bad things. But it's another matter when a wrong-
doer repeats those bad acts over and over, and then, when
caught, tries to plead the statute of limitations to escape accoun-
tability for the earlier actions that have continued unabated....
In the instant case, one can apply the continuing tort theory to
claim that the most recent "conversion" by the bank was when
the statute of limitations began to run. But one may also view
the case as one where fraudulent concealment or similar con-
duct by the bank "equitably tolled" the statute of limitations
which had begun running at each of the earlier episodes. It's
unclear what the majority opinion means on these two different
issues; but either way, the bank should not be able to get away
with alleged misconduct when they never stopped engaging in
95
A problem that currently exists in the legal profession is that a
lawyer who is most likely to "drop the ball" and fail to diligent-
ly prosecute a client's case is also most likely to be unable, or
simply not bother, to purchase legal malpractice insurance. The
end result is that when a circuit court, like in this case, dis-
misses a case due to the lawyer's inactivity, the client is left
94 Black v. CSX Transp., Inc., 648 S.E.2d 610, 620 (W. Va. 2007) (Starcher, J., concurring).
95 Copier Word Processing Supply, Inc. v. WesBanco Bank, Inc., 640 S.E.2d 102, 113 (W. Va.
2006) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
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with recourse against a lawyer with few assets. In other words,
the client ends up suffering.
96
Gentlemen, start your engines. The majority has dropped the
checkered flag in favor of the defendant in a speedy analysis of
whether the plaintiff was shoved aside, allowing the defendant
to take the lead in operating the plaintiffs business. This case
presents a summary result where, had the parties each been al-
lowed to tell his story side-by-side to a jury, the result might
have been quite different....
My thinking is, if the shoe had been on the other foot, and Mr.
Fry had on opening day suddenly refused to sell a single set of
tires or a splash of gas to drivers at Mr. Chapman's new race-
track, Mr. Chapman would feel that he had a right to a trial to
show he lost business and profits under the contract. Basically,
a jury should be allowed to decide whether or not Mr. Chap-
man's conduct was the pits.
If the majority had simply "whoa'd down" a little bit, it would
also have discovered in the final turns of this event that the re-
sult dictated by the Golden Rule is also supported by settled le-
gal principles-also fairly easy to understand-which strongly
suggest that this case should not have been disposed of by a
quick drop of the checkered flag called summary judgment.
97
Following my "anti-gotcha!" approach, I wrote for the Court in Brad-
shaw v. Soulsby98:
We cannot conceive of how a beneficiary could be required to
bring an action-within 2 years of a person's death-without
knowledge that the person has died, without knowledge that the
death was caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of
another individual, or without knowledge of the identity of that
individual. It is precisely these situations, where a beneficiary
96 Covington v. Smith, 582 S.E.2d 756, 773 (W. Va. 2003) (Starcher, J., concurring).
97 Fry Racing Enters., Inc. v. Chapman, 497 S.E.2d 541, 545-547 (W. Va. 1997) (Starcher, J.,
dissenting).
98 558 S.E.2d 681 (W. Va. 2001).
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reasonably lacks knowledge of these elements necessary to
prove a case, where the discovery rule was intended to apply. 99
I also expressed my "anti-gotcha!" philosophy writing for the Court in
Burkes v. Fas-Chek Food Mart Inc.' ° (defining "good cause" for extending the
period for serving a complaint); Farm Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Thorn Lumber
Co.'0 ' (setting hearing standards to establish damages in default judgment cas-
es); Brooks v. Isinghood02 (setting standards for "relation-back" of amended
complaints); and Gaither v. City Hospital, Inc. 103 (defining the "discovery rule"
in civil cases for tolling the statute of limitations).
M. State Constitutional Law
One of the most important duties of the West Virginia Supreme Court is
to interpret the provisions of our Constitution, and I have written frequently on
state constitutional issues. Am I a "strict constructionist" or an "activist judge
who legislates from the bench" (to be defined in the final pages of this writing)?
You be the judge! Here are some excerpts from my writing in this area:
I believe that the $1,000,000.00 "cap" imposed by W. Va. Code,
55-7B-8 [1986] is a patent violation of the equal protection and
certain remedy provisions of the West Virginia Constitution.
This discriminatory statute arbitrarily treats similarly situated
persons differently and unfairly, and often deprives severely in-
jured plaintiffs a remedy by due course of law. A plaintiff who
is injured by the negligence of anyone other than a "health care
provider" can collect his or her full damages as awarded by a
jury-but a plaintiff who is injured by the negligence of a
"health care provider" cannot. Why should health care provid-
ers get more protection for their carelessness than others do as a
vehicle driver, homeowner, or provider of other professional
services?' °4
The Legislature cannot just give a Grant Committee a pot of
money and tell them to "go do good stuff." That is constitution-
99 Id. at 688.
100 617 S.E.2d 838, 844-45 (W. Va. 2005).
101 501 S.E.2d 786 (W. Va. 1998).
102 584 S.E.2d 531, 541 (W. Va. 2003).
103 487 S.E.2d 901, 909 (W. Va. 1997).
104 Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406, 413 (W. Va. 2001) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
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ally impermissible-there must be some real standards set by
law, not just by the Committee itself on an ad hoc basis....
In State ex rel. Holmes v. Gainer, 191 W.Va. 686, 447 S.E.2d
887 (1994), this Court found that a legislative pay raise had
been put in place in violation of a constitutional timing re-
quirement-but because it was a "technical" mistake in an area
where the law was unclear, this Court approved the legislative
pay raise-and said, in effect, "Go and sin no more."
Could and should we have said-"go and sin no more"-in this
case?
I judge "no"-not with more than $200 million of public dollars
at stake. That would send a message that a statute could violate
basic constitutional principles, but this Court would neverthe-
less approve the results of the statute for political expediency or
because--quite frankly-there were "thousands of jobs at
stake.' 1 5
Prior to this case, no West Virginia judicial officer or employee
has ever been barred from running for any judicial office-
because, of course, their right to do so is specifically reserved in
our Constitution....
Not long after the Constitution of this state was adopted, Justice
Brannon warned that permitting additional qualifications for of-
fice to be imposed-by any process other than constitutional
amendment-would make the fundamental right to hold public
office "subject to the fluctuation of sentiment, the caprices of
constantly changing legislatures, the passions of the hour:
If one additional material qualification may be prescribed,
why not another? Why not many others? The constitution
is fundamental law, and strictly construed in defense of the
citizen's rights. It is the Magna Carta of his freedom and
rights, political and civil. Admit once that it does not fix
his qualification for office. Where would his disfranchise-
ment end? That would depend upon uncertain political, re-
ligious, or other winds. Would we limit the act within the
105 State ex rel. West Virginia Citizens Action Group v. West Virginia Econ. Dev. Grant
Comm., 580 S.E.2d 869, 896 (W. Va. 2003) (Starcher, J., concurring).
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bounds of the reasonable? That would be indefinite, unsafe,
precarious, dependant upon the times and motives and aims
dominating them. Against these things, it was intended to
embed the right in the solid rock of the constitution.... 106
The majority opinion unconstitutionally steals the right to
choose from the voters of this State. The majority has, in effect,
successfully assisted the Hilton Head/Lincoln Navigator crowd
in hijacking an election from the Myrtle Beach/pickup truck
folks.
107
My sense is that our sovereign immunity jurisprudence has
come to be-from a theoretical or academic perspective-fairly
confused.
I further sense that this jurisprudential confusion has unfortu-
nately created a fertile field for opportunistic attempts by liti-
gants to escape liability for their wrongdoing, by the last-
minute assertion of sovereign immunity.
Frankly, what does rather ancient and eroded constitutional lan-
guage have to do with a multi-million-dollar hospital corpora-
tion's last-ditch attempt to escape paying money to a doctor
who had to spend $300,000.00 in attorney fees to get what he
was legally entitled to? In my judgment, very little. Yet this
scenario, of course, is the instant case in a nutshell.1
0 8
Marmaduke Dent, the eminent and humane West Virginia jurist
who served on this Court from 1893 to 1904, once commented
that a decision exonerating a railroad for negligently killing cat-
tle, after first attracting them to the tracks with salt, was "re-
pugnant to the sense and justice of every reasonable man not
learned in the intricacies of railroad jurisprudence." Kirk v.
Norfolk & W.R. Co., 41 W.Va. 722, 732, 24 S.E. 639, 643
(1896) (Dent, J., dissenting).
106 State ex rel. Carenbauer v. Hechler, 542 S.E.2d 405, 423-24, 431 (W. Va. 2000) (Starcher,
J., dissenting) (quoting State ex rel. Thompson v. McAllister, 18 S.E. 770, 777-78 (1893)).
107 Hechler, 542 S.E.2d at 423-24, 431 (Starcher, J., dissenting).
108 Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trustees ex rel. W. Va. Univ. v. Graf, 516 S.E.2d 741, 747-748 (W.
Va. 1998) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
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The majority opinion has the same characteristics that Judge
Dent identified over 100 years ago. The majority opinion wor-
ries about the "inconvenience" to railroads of having to main-
tain crossings. What about the inconvenience to businesses,
farmers and landowners who have to drive dozens of miles be-
cause a railroad unilaterally tears up a crossing that has been
used for decades? 109
In one state constitutional law case, State ex rel. McGraw v. Burton,
10
my opinion addressed the thorny issue of the duties and powers of the attorney
general, vis-a-vis executive branch agencies who were using their own attor-
neys. The opinion stated in Syllabus Points 2, 4, and 5:
2. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 1 of the West Virginia Con-
stitution, the Attorney General of the State of West Virginia is
the State's chief legal officer, which status necessarily implies
having the constitutional responsibility for providing legal
counsel to State officials and State entities.111
4. The inherent constitutional functions of the Office of the At-
torney General of the State of West Virginia include: (1) to play
a central role in the provision of day-to-day professional legal
services to State officials and entities in and associated with the
executive branch of government; (2) to play a central role in en-
suring that the adoption and assertion of legal policy and posi-
tions by the State of West Virginia and State entities, particular-
ly before tribunals, is made only after meaningful consideration
of the potential effects of such legal policy and positions on the
full range of State entities and interests; (3) to assure that a con-
stitutional officer who is directly elected by and accountable to
the people may express his legal view on matters of State legal
policy generally and particularly before tribunals where the
State is a party.
1 12
5. In light of long-established statutes, practice, and precedent
recognizing that State executive branch and related entities may
in some circumstances employ and use lawyers who are not
employees of the Attorney General, such employment and
109 A & M Properties, Inc. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 506 S.E.2d 632, 639-640 (W. Va. 1998)
(Starcher, J., dissenting).
110 569 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 2002).
III Id. at 101.
112 Id. at 101-02.
[Vol. I111
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use-and statutes, rules, and policies authorizing such employ-
ment and use-are not per se or facially unconstitutional."
3
N. United States Constitution
Our State Supreme Court has jurisdiction to resolve disputes involving
the provisions of the United States Constitution. I have written several opinions
for our Court addressing U.S. Constitutional issues; happily, the opinions were
not reversed by the United States Supreme Court.
One such case was United States Steel Mining Co., LLC v. Helton,'
1 4
where a number of coal companies challenged West Virginia's coal severance
tax as violating the Import Export Clause of the United States Constitution, art.
I, sec. 10, cl. 2. A lot was at stake-about $360 million dollars in past sever-
ance taxes and $40 to $50 million annually in future tax revenue. Writing for
the Court in U.S. Steel, I concluded:
To uphold the refunds requested by the appellants and the re-
sulting prospective loss of coal production severance tax reve-
nue would be-again undisputedly-a body blow to the welfare
and public fisc of West Virginia and her citizens.
If the severance taxes in question are clearly unconstitutional,
they must of course be invalidated, without regard to the fiscal
effect of such a ruling.
But for this Court to overrule the studied decision of the West
Virginia Legislature to impose certain taxes-to deny the
people of the State the benefit of laws enacted by their repre-
sentatives and of crucial revenue-a strong and clear showing
of the taxes' invalidity would be necessary.
No such showing has been made.'
15
Although I believe our decision rested on sound legal ground, as a loyal
"Mountaineer," I admit to a slight "bias" toward interpreting the U. S. Constitu-
tion so as to cause no severe economic harm to West Virginia.
In Morris v. Crown Equipment Corp.,' 16 the U.S. Constitutional provi-
sion at issue was the Privileges & Immunities Clause, art. IV, sec. 2. The issue
was whether a statute could deny a Virginia resident access to the West Virginia
13 Id. at 102.
114 631 S.E.2d 559, 561 (W. Va. 2005).
115 Id. at 568.
116 633 S.E.2d 292, 297-98 (W. Va. 2006).
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court system, when a West Virginia resident would have had such access." 7 I
wrote an opinion for the Court that said citizens and residents of other states
can't be discriminated against, per se, in access to the courts."1 8 This decision
was "chided" by the West Virginia business community.
0. Gambling
I will conclude with my thoughts on gambling. I do not like it, not on
moral grounds, but on economic grounds. I do not care if rich people gamble
every night. But I hate to see people who cannot afford to gamble having an
addicting "carrot on a stick" waved before them by State-sponsored slick adver-
tising.
In State ex rel. Cities of Charleston, Huntington and its Counties of
Ohio and Kanawha v. West Virginia Economic Development Authority,119 I
penned not a dissent, but a concurring "lament":
Professionally, I think that the Legislature, which has over-
whelmingly and repeatedly voted to establish a massive, state-
wide, government--operated gambling system in West Virgin-
ia-and to finance a significant piece of our public budget from
that system-has the legal right to do so under our Constitution.
Personally, I question whether it is right or wise for my gov-
ernment to set up and operate this massive, statewide, govern-
ment-operated gambling system-and to use, in managing this
system, thousands of privately-managed sites that are impossi-
ble to supervise and monitor; and to also use thousands of gam-
bling devices that are known to be especially dangerous and ad-
dictive; and then to make it next to impossible for future gen-
erations to cancel, revamp, or restrict this system, because of
the legal obligation to pay off bonds that are based on gambling
revenues....
Under the system created by the Legislature, we can expect to
have between twenty to forty (closer to forty) thousand West
Virginia adults, and about five thousand West Virginia teenag-
ers-at any given time-who are problem or pathological gam-
blers.
The effects of these thousands of West Virginians' severe gam-
bling problems-on their families, jobs, schools, communities,
117 Id. at 298.
118 Id. at 299-300.
119 588 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 2003).
[Vol. 111
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and households-will directly and negatively affect several hun-
dred thousand other West Virginians: family members, employ-
ers, etc. Many personal bankruptcies will originate in gambling
problems, as will many incidents of crime, suicide, divorce, and
domestic violence. Less than five percent of West Virginians
with gambling problems will seek help; of those, perhaps half
will be able to recover significantly....
It appears to me, however, that the system that the Legislature
has created-massive, statewide, convenience gambling-is
pretty much the exact opposite of a sound approach.
Furthermore, the Legislature does not even allow gamblers to
have the best chance of success, or at least to prolong their en-
tertainment as they lose their money. Instead, the Legislature
sets high odds against gamblers (much higher than Las Vegas).
Then, the massive gambling revenues, well above the costs of
doing business, are treated as a "cash cow" for our government,
which becomes dependent upon these revenues. The Legislature
is even issuing bonds that must be paid from money taken from
our State's children decades from now, when they become gam-
blers. Talk about a credit-card government!
To me, this is a dismal situation. For these reasons, I personally





Looking back over these many opinions, several themes emerge. First,
because elementary notions of fairness to people often conflict with the legal
details of commercial relationships (like employment or insurance), the law in
these areas must be interpreted and applied carefully so as not to achieve clearly
unfair results. Second, the general public and individuals need strong protection
from the tremendous powers of the state-for example, in cases of environmen-
tal and property protection, agency abuses of power (including courts), and state
fiscal policy (that relies on schemes like gambling for financing basic services).
Third, the criminal justice system needs to address the victim-and the public
fisc-as well as the criminal actor. Finally, "gotcha justice" should not trump
120 State ex rel. Cities of Charleston, Huntington and its Counties of Ohio and Kanawha v.
West Virginia Econ. Dev. Auth., 588 S.E.2d 655, 674-76 (W. Va. 2003) (Starcher, J., concurring
and lamenting).
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the resolution of conflicts on the merits of the case-as those merits are judged
by "the community" (that is, a jury), to the greatest extent possible. Overall, I
have attempted to practice people-oriented justice. My approach is rooted in my
personal experiences, where I have met and worked with people in all walks of
life-people in whom I have always looked for the good, and in whom I have
almost always found it.
Earlier in this article I invited the reader to look at my judicial "track
record" on constitutional issues, to try to classify my judicial philosophy. Such
classification is common in our society's political debates and discussions about
the judiciary. The political right tends to be critical of so-called "activist
judges," claiming those judges misread constitutional and statutory law and
promote a social agenda, by "legislating from the bench." Some advocates ar-
gue that "strict constructionist" judges should transport themselves back into
history hundreds of years and apply the law as the founding fathers of this na-
tion would have. On the political left, some advocates are equally critical of
"too conservative" judges who are unwilling to see our laws and constitutions as
"living documents," to be interpreted in light of current social and technological
realities. After three decades of hearing these arguments, my conclusion is, if
you agree with my interpretation of a statute or constitutional provision, I am a
"strict constructionist." If you disagree with my interpretation, I'm an "activist
judge" legislating from the bench! Take your pick!
I would like to again thank the West Virginia Law Review for publishing
this article. And I would like to say a deep and heartfelt "thank-you" to West
Virginia University-and in particular to the College of Law-for providing me
with the means to be successful in my professional life and, in turn, for my
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